

Nationalism and Modernism
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--- Introduction

- Nation is the people
- State is the government

In the intro he first presents nationalism as something that has risen and fallen. It perhaps had its apogee in the 1960s nationalism; during these times we spoke of nation building.

By the late 1980s this was seen as naïve.

He says “tides of immigration and massive increase in communication” put into question whether or not nationalism is a “healthy model.” (Herein we see a confusion of the West and the world. And this is an argument against immigration as much as an argument against nationalism).

“Classic Modernism” held that nations and nationalism are intrinsic to the nature of the modern world. Again, this peaked in the 1960s.

Since then they’ve been undermined by these thoughts:

1. The shape of nations are unpredictable. (This is a definitional problem, not a reality problem).
2. But sociologists still noted their power.
3. The idea that nations are only a historical event in a particular time of history.
4. A growing emphasis on all being socially created; a construct engineered by elites.
5. And so the idea was to look at nations as they are now, as sociologists.

Part 1: Looks at the classical paradigm and its varieties and its early critics.

Part 2: Looks at critiques of classical modernism (primordial, sociobiological, and historical backings of the nation idea).

Part 3: Recent developments in the field.

--- Chapter 1 – The Rise of Classical Modernism

Three main issues in the theory of nationalism are:

- 1) Ethical and philosophical. What does the nation mean for individuals and their identity?
- 2) Anthropological and political: How do we define a nation now?
- 3) Historical and sociological: Are nations ancient or recent constructs?

Early forerunners:

Herder and John Stuart Mill argued for the right of national self determination. In 1882 Ernest Renan thought of the active political commitment that made a nation (done to counter the militant nature of other nationalisms). He spoke of the collective past and future as defining a nation.

At this point, nation and race were used interchangeably and so they were seen as primordial.

Marx imbibed this romantic current and denigrated unhistorical, backward nations.

Intellectual foundations:

Marx, Crowd Psychology, Weber and Durkheim. For each, nationalism is peripheral.

12 - Marx look at nations are real. But the impetus was (surprise) economic. The cultural part was relegated or epiphenomenal. The nation was also epiphenomenal to economics.

13 - Crowd psychology - Georges Simmel, Mead, Adorno, for example

“What these approaches have in common is a belief in the dislocating nature of modernity, its disorientation of the individual and its capacity for disrupting the stability of traditional sources of support.”

Weber looks at political action being responsible for the formation of nations. In 1948 he described a nation as a community of sentiment that would adequately manifest a state of its own. He said this quest for statehood is what differentiates nations from other communities. For him is the apogee of occidental rationalism and modernism. And the nation and state need each other for legitimization and protection.

15 - Durkheim makes the moral community and its conscience collective a guiding thread of his work.

Famously, he describes “mechanical” solidarity, such as in the blood of tribes, and organic solidarity. Modernism makes us more organic, but the primal mechanistic still remains.

Historians and Social Scientists

These had two strains, sociological and historical.

Hans Kohn developed Eastern v. Western sorts of nationalism. This is a sociological move. Strong bourgeoisies lead to voluntary nationalisms; the opposite, authoritarian. Carr came up with the history of nationalism that is sociological.

We also get histories of nationalism. They fight over the starting date. Most dated the birth from the French Revolution.

It was only in the 1950s that historians proper started to dominate the study of Nationalism. Now it is several fields combined.

18 - The classical modernist paradigm of nationalism

Classical modernism fought the idea of nations as nearly perennial.

Classical modernists asserted:

1. Nations were not ancient or immemorial.
2. Nations are in no way a given.
3. Many nations are relatively recent in origin.
4. We shouldn't read the idea of nationalism backwards.
5. Nations were not naturally occurring by the result of plans deployed.

Classical modernism denounced the idea that nations have roots. It had an activist auto-emancipatory spirit: nothing is a given, so we can remake all.

19 - Nation - Building

The activist nature of nation building, supported nation building. The proponents thought:

- 1) Nations were political communities.
- 2) Political bond is stronger than all others.
- 3) They are the main international actors: so good for their people.
- 4) Elites build them.
- 5) They are the main vehicle for development.

They held that mass education and industrialism made the nation possible. Self-government couldn't have come earlier. As religion fell, nations took their place. And, they are, again, necessary for development.

Modernism and Perennialism

Behind the immediate model was the larger component of classical modernism's paradigm.

- 1) Nations are modern.
- 2) They are the product of modernity.
- 3) They are not deeply rooted in history
- 4) It is part of the process of modernization
- 5) They are social constructs.

Perennialism and Modernism are polar opposites.

Perennialism
Cultural community

Modernism
Political community

Immemorial	Modern
Organic	Mechanical
Seamless	Divided
Qualities make you belong	Resource make you belong
Popular	Elite-constructed
Ancestrally-based	Communication-based

Anti-colonial nationalists want things both ways; the nation is rooted in history and a construct of national elites. Nationalism is an activist, autoemancipatory programme for the oppressed.

Pg 24 - The main varieties of modernism examined in the next chapter are socio-cultural, economic, political and ideological. They were developed in the 1970s and 80s.

PART 1 – VARIETIES OF MODERNISM

Chapter 2 – The Culture of Industrialism

Ernest Gellner's 1964 work is a milestone. When villagers get swept into metropolises, language and culture become their only way to cement their ties to society. Thus the intelligencia became important. They also taught numeracy in schools. The bigger the nation, the bigger the school system.

27 – 28 This also brought the first culture clashes. Often this resulted in ethnic job reservation. Thus both sides became more nationalist.

As Gellner's theory had problems, he reformulated it in Nations and Nationalism.

"Nation" and "Nationalism"

Gellner's revision featured high culture and schools. Gellner was attacked by Renan because culture itself cannot be the definition of nation. Other groups, such as the boy scouts, have a shared culture.

So finally for Gellner the nation is a political principle, 'which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent.' Nationalist movements are those which express the sentiment that a people and their state should be congruent.

Agroliterate and industrial societies

Tribes can't have nationalism, agricultural states could but don't, industrial nations do. In the agriculture the elite strata use culture to separate themselves from the rest of society below. Each sector below has its own culture.

These societies have neither the possibility nor the inclination to create a single homogeneous culture.

Industrial societies do require a homogeneous culture for context free communication: this facilitates business across the nation and mobility.

Public education gives basic skills and a loyalty to culture.

From 'low' to 'high' cultures

Pg 32 - In the transition to industrialism, we go from low to high culture. A nation is a society with high culture.

33 - so for Gellner, nationalism cannot be torn asunder from modernism. It is a feature of the industrial age. The form of nationalism itself is patched together any which way. (What of James Madison studying Western constitutions to devise ours? Were Greece and Rome not models on his mind?)

Nationalism and Industrialism

In Gellner's earlier version, language was the glue; in the later formulation, mass education in the creation of citizens in sustaining high culture.

In the earlier, the intelligentsia is important; later, the State. This is a move from the agents of modernization, to structures of modernity.

But the idea of nations as agents of homogeneity to meet industrial needs stays the same.

36 - People have asked if there really, though, is a, "nationalism in general." Can one theory cover all? Also, more problematic, many nations predated industrialism. His theory also raises questions about only industrial nations being really nations and the relationship of traditional culture to modernity.

Nationalism and 'High Cultures'

38 - High culture is a cultivated urban personnel. But is the sacrifice for the fatherland really a defense of an educationally sustained high culture? Education does not really explain people's passion for their nation.

Nationalism and public education

39 - People have worked to instill nationalism via public education. But mass education is the product, not the cause of nationalism. Prior to a state, the nationalists fight for a country. So this is pre-public school.

Often nationalists get created in colonial schools or when studying abroad in Europe. But, once in power, yes, they will compete via setting up education systems with nationalist themes.

But, from the soviet bloc to LA, mass education often does not succeed in instilling loyalty.

Furthermore, most states are pluralistic. And, the attempt to inculcate increases this tension. We then have a civic rather than ethnic nationalism. So it is not to homogenize the population but to unify them under certain values, symbols, myths, and memories. And the minority values are allowed to continue, but are melded. And, we have, in this vein adopted multiculturalism.

Nationalism and historical continuity

Ethnics come to appreciate their culture more when they realize it is not that of the mainstream of society. And often the low culture inspires more than the high culture.

42 - History, and "our ancestors," inspire. They also make hard policies palpable.

But while elites might use history for their purposes, it then controls them. You cannot just warp history either. Revolutionaries soon graft the standard history to their narrative.

Nationalism unites different generations. Cosmopolitanism does the opposite.

Nationalism and the ethnic past

45 - Ethnicity is sometimes seen as the same as nationalism. Sometimes, it is seen as that which divides nations.

In terms of the origin of nations, the switch to "culture" doesn't help. Often these groups do not become nations. Why do some and not others?

And, Smith says, culture is not a place for ethnonationalists to pick and choose from various cultures. They cannot be dismembered and served up ala carte, he says. The intelligentsia rediscover a heritage and way of living. The rediscovery provides memories, values, symbols, and myths.

But these pasts have a popular resonance because they are founded on living traditions of the people (or segments of the people). To succeed the remembered past must sustain in the face of historical enquiry and criticism. This makes the extended society like a family.

Broad theories like Gellner's ignore particular histories and so cannot tell us why some emerge and others do not.

Chapter 3 Capitalism and Nationalism

Many theories link capitalism and nationalism. These are socioeconomic variants of classical modernism. Here we'll consider some recent attempts.

47 - Marx is the background to these models. Marx and Engels defined modern nations as "communities of language and natural sympathies. So they were somewhat natural. But, 'nationalism' were outgrowths of industrial capitalism. You need, as Gellner said, a homogeneous language group to facilitate capitalism.

The overthrow of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat would not mean the end of nationalism. The proletariat's ability to unify was aided by their sense of being a nation.

They distinguished between history-less folks with no history of a state which were regressive and those with a history that were progressive.

But capitalism often squeezed out the intelligentsia and nervous bourgeoisie often used nationalist ideologies to induce false consciousness.

They liked anti-colonial liberation movements and thought all genuine nations had a right to secede.

Imperialism and uneven development

49 - Nairn revises Marxism with a theory concerning dependency and imperialism. The key is not capitalism, but uneven development of capitalism. After 1800 we have the capitalist centers in the West and the peripheries.

In the West we have an ideal model wherein nations develop economically - one helping the other. But, in the outside, they are besieged by us. The elites of the periphery have no weapons or power, but they can rally the people via nationalisms.

To do this the elite must extol the common culture and adopt a form of romanticism. They must invite the masses into history. Nationalism then is facing forward and backward at the same time.

Populism and romanticism

51 - As with Gellner's we must ask if the theory encompasses all cases.

While Nairn recognizes that ethnic tensions predated capitalism and dependency, they only provide raw materials in his scheme. And the masses play no part except playthings of the intelligentsia.

As a counter example, Smith provides the more 'sober bourgeois' nationalism of America's revolution. We didn't rely on a 'people' so much. Not all nationalists are romantics.

'Nationalism-producing development?'

Also against Nairn, his formula explains periphery nationalisms. But the earliest nationalisms were in the center.

Nationalisms have also developed in developed nations, such as recently in Eastern Europe.

The existence or lack of existence of ethnic history does not seem to determine the rise of nationalism.

Nairn combines economic reductionism with romantic nationalism. Ethno-history and ethnicity – as with other Marxists – get diminished as important factors. They are simply dependent variables.

In reality nationalism has an "explosive unpredictability."

55 - And, in using the Japanese, I think Smith is making a culturist argument: Namely, that culture can cause or thwart development.

The social base of nationalism

For many the intelligentsia is the main instigator of nationalism (Smith counts himself in this category along side Anderson, Kedourie, and Gellner). What is less clear is the relationship between the intelligentsia and the people. And, are the 'people' always involved?

The Eastern European model has a strong presence of intellectuals. It is not sure that this model can be generalized. But, they must be present to explain the benefits of solidarity and independence to folks. If they disagree, and rival nationalisms emerge, the movement is jeopardized.

Internal colonialism

Michael Hechter has moved us away from the Marxist basis of socioeconomic modernism.

58 - When political incorporation was added to economic exploitation Wales, Ireland and Scotland became internal colonies. Hi status jobs, in Hechter's model, go to those in cities. At some point perhaps the in-group did not let the "disadvantaged" group in. Later integration may be hindered by the out group's separatist movement.

60 – In addition to a cultural identity and inequalities communications amongst the oppressed group are needed. Thus we can have cultural rather than economic separatism as the base of struggle. He applies this to the Celtic situation.

Ethno-Regionalism

But Hechter's model does not explain nationalism in advanced areas like Catalonia, the Basque country and Croatia. And why not Southern Italy? But, mostly, it again treats culture as epiphenomenal. He says that culture caused the exclusion but gives it no role in the revival.

63 - Separatist groups are interested in their history and culture. It is not the land, but the land where their heroes walked that matters.

Walker Connor has argued that economics play only a contributory or catalytic role in fomenting ethnic separatism. Ethnic nationalism happens in advanced and developing cultures. Economics provide no clear pattern; on the other side, there is "clear evidence" of ethnic sentiment.

Elite strategies of 'rational choice'

Why do folks join these elite led movements when they don't have to? Hechter says it is just like other groups: You join for individual benefits (after a cost / benefit analysis). He does admit that great sacrifice may be exhibited on the part of participants. This is after, he says, repression by the State.

Interest and passion

Again, his cost / benefit analysis leaves no room for beliefs or ideologies. Smith asks if Hitler's killing Jews to the last moment, when resources were needed for war, had no ideological component. '

Within rational choice Hechter pay attention to structural feasibility. This makes him like others.

Donald Horowitz uses group esteem. He analyses stereotypes of the group by the colonial powers, or their ethnic neighbors. Then he categorizes the economy as advanced or backwards. Those in the latter group have nothing to lose.

Advanced groups in backwards areas, by way of contrast, are late seceders. Backwards groups in advanced areas don't secede either as they normally have few numbers.

In sum, Horowitz's structural analysis is better than Hechter's. Overall, the two do point to the import of structure in such romantic movements.

Chapter 4 – State and Nation

In the West the State and the nation emerged together.

Sources of political modernism

Theorists have sometimes seen the State as the progenitor of nations. Political and military forces then become key. This third variant of modernism is what will be discussed here.

Pg 70 - The origins of this view are fourfold.

- 1) Weber, with his bureaucracy and State monopolization of power. The administration gives a legal-rational kind of legitimization for the modern state.
- 2) Marxist analysis says the nation appears when the State leaves the individual naked in front of it.
- 3) Simmel, national competition and warfare make the state.
- 4) The revolution in communications model.

The reflexive state

Anthony Giddens most clearly represents this POV. For him the nation only reinforces territorial cohesion of the state. The State is one of many in the UN and it is supported by laws.

73 - The rise of a stable administration from fixed capital cities is what facilitates nations. Giddens doesn't look at or think sociologically significant, those nations without states. Nationalism is the cultural sensibility of sovereignty.

The relation between state and nation is rarely frictionless. Usually the State contains opposition nationalisms. And nations come from the disruptions of traditions by modernity (not economic disparities). Therefore, all nationalist movements are political.

The nation beyond the state

The State can give rise to nations; especially in the state – nations of Africa.

But there is a problem with State-based explanations of nationalism. For one, not all nationalisms have opted for States.

Perhaps more importantly is the problem of cultural nationalism. As John Hutchinson has shown, this is a force in its own right. Where political nationalism is a dead end, cultural nationalism coordinates energies. Gaelic ideals exist with no Irish home rule.

The State-centered vision also suffers from a western bias. Giddens sees nations as coming out of absolutism. Even in the West though, America and Dutch, Irish, and French nationalism were oppositional movements aimed at the State. But in Eastern Europe and under the Ottoman, the nations that emerged were not just oppositional. These 'nations' existed solidly prior to the aggrieved State.

Where as the West went State to nation, Eastern Europe and Asia went nation to State.

75 - His saying the nation only has significance in a state would leave nationalism highly under-theorized. We could not speak of Polish nation between its first disappearance in the late 18th century and its being reconstituted in 1918. That would mean there was no Scotland till the Scottish National Party.

Giddens mostly sees nations as primordial and based on exclusion of others. It fails to recognize dynamics within. As a prop for States, he doesn't illuminate the chasm between the State structure and subjective nationalisms.

Nations and the inter-state order

Charles Tilly also looks at the State and holds the nation as an afterthought. For Tilly war is the creator of state making. So again, nation disappears. Roger Brubaker does a variation of the same State - to - nation explanation.

77 - Ethnic communities exist. And they are not just abstractions. If anything, the State is more abstract as it is not lived.

Ethnic groups existed in Tsarist Russia. Marx had to theorize about nations. If they are just playthings of States, why do they exist when not equal with the state?

James Mayall looks at nations within the global context. Westphalia in 1648 created a world of princely states and so a new international order. But, we now have 200 plus states with nations. And, they are the players and attempting to freeze the international map. The New World Order is founding on nationalism. New states since 1945 have only been allowed if ex colonials, not seceding. That was the idea.

The break up of the USSR and Ethiopia brought some 20 new states since 1991. But then there was Bosnia. Are international organizations dedicated to minority rights undermining sovereignty?

The State and War

War has long led to a feeling of solidarity. In modern times it has also aided in creating administrative states.

Michael Mann claims that real, cross-class nations emerged only in the end of the 18th century, under pressures of fiscal crisis and state militarism. This created greater conscription and debt which helped to consolidate the nation. It was the pressures of war, not capitalist crystallisations that made them.

81 – Post Bonaparte, we start to get nations.

In Germany and Austria the lack of fit between language and political boundaries made the first romantic stirrings of scholarly nationalism curiously ‘cultural’ and a-political. But French militarism made the rest of the ‘people’ a product of war mobilization.

The last phase of nation creating came from the expanded state under capitalism in the late 19th century. The apparatus of education, health care, taxation, communication homogenized. But this built on the peasant nationalisms formed in war.

A political theory of nationalism?

Michael Mann says when the State conscripted, the people demanded rights. That is how we got citizens and nations.

In the Hapsburg breakup, those that got states is predicted by the presence or absence of regional administration.

But, asks Smith, how can this be supported in Central Europe in Germany and Italy: Why not Prussia or Piedmontese? Why were these battles for German and Italian nations? What are these entities, accidents?

83 - Mann is right to say that nationalism came with a cry for democratization. But, why did this come in the form of nationalism? If the nation rose fighting a foreign authoritarian royalty, how did it get foreign?

And again, nationalists don't only fight for sovereignty for political reasons, they fight for a homeland where their people can exist in their ways. It isn't just the shape, but the content that is fought for.

State and society: Bridging the gulf?

84 - John Breuilly works to come to grips with the idea of the state as the focus and goal of nationalism. His is, as per this chapter, a political theory of nationalism.

Many non-Western nations' birth was done under the right to assert their non-western culture. But Breuilly is only interested in the politically significant nationalisms.

Broadly, he says nationalism is able to seize power in the state because it can generate mass support, bring different social groups together and provide a rationale for their separate social interests being joined. The sub-elite have been particularly important in nations formed via opposition to a state.

Trade unions mobilized greatly in WW 1 and 2. It wasn't just intellectuals. This doesn't mean that ideology is not important.

The fundamental situation was modernity. It brought a chasm between administration and civil society. Nationalism entered this 'yawning' chasm. The nationalists try to rejoin the civil society and the state.

88 - This movement uses the restoration of the great past very well. Thus the rise of nationalism happened in relation to the state, not because of it and not without reference to it.

Identity and politics

Breuilly excludes the need for identity from his analysis because it is hard to measure. But, he still recognizes its power. He also is reluctant to go into realms of irrationality. (Has he not studied biology or seen people forming groups everywhere?) He is, after all, a historian, not a psychologist.

89 - "Precision and rigor should not be bought at the cost of excluding a concept's key elements and its differentiating characteristics."

90- But we should include culture, says Smith, as it is a main component of nationalism *and* it allows us to study different kinds of nationalism - religious, racial, linguistic, and cultural.

Indeed, there are 'pure' cultural nationalists who have remained silent about the state. Yeats and Aurobindo and the Irish Gaelic revival for example.

Furthermore, many nationalisms do not want independence, just recognition within a federation (Catalans and Scots for example).

And if nationalism is a form of politics, it is even more so a form of culture and society - a look for authenticity aimed at regenerating society.

Intellectuals and nationalist ideology

Breuilly's focus on politics does a service and he is not unaware of the role of culture. But can we safely separate the political movement of nationalism from the growth of a sense of national identity. Are these not joined, not just in some, but in all cases?

But can national movements emerge without some sense of national identity among the elites? Breuilly says there is a specific sense in which intellectuals, notably

educators, are crucial to nationalism: They propose the category of the nation in the first place and endow it with symbolic significance. They provide images and symbols.

Without these nationalism would be bereft of that self-reflexive quality which Breuilly and Giddens give them so much of their power. Hence, such symbolism should be taken as seriously as political manifestations.

92 - The land the nationalists seek is not just that of territory, but of symbolic / historic significance, tying people to their ancestors. Anderson tells us, this turns territory into a homeland.

Political modernism and ethnic history

This returns us to the modernist claim that nations are only modern and form via modernity. Breuilly says nations form in alienation. (Well the state has become too objective). It fills the chasm wherein the government treats people solely as individuals in a capitalist society. Intellectuals, Breuilly and Kedourie state, most feel the brunt of this alienation from the mechanical society.

93 - But why should this alienation turn to nationalism? Why is the 'nation' the answer to their discontent?

And civic nationalisms don't do the cultural so much.

(A citizen is one who in a time of crisis, if at no other time, instinctively rises to the defense of their nation). So latent nationalism does exist. This happens even in civic nationalism countries like USA, USA, USA.

In the times of the formation of England and France, the cultures were relatively united cultural groups. (Smith 1986).

So even in the West where Breuilly's political definition is best fit, culture rears its head. They used a common administrative language from the late medieval times as well as religious unity.

Breuilly and others see the culture as an instrumental tool used by elites. Why then were they so popular?

Conclusion

A benefit of political analysis is that they highlight the active citizen masses in the creation of states.

Along with citizenship goes borders. (kingdoms often had fluctuating frontiers). And political analysis brings in the variable of the State. This is needed.

But the state could only arise as a nationalist goal. And, this look at the political leaders needs to be supplemented with a "bottom up" perspective.

96 - Finally, this modernist approach precludes a role for ethnic origins and history.

Chapter 5 – Political Messianism

'Political religion'

97 - In the 1960s and 1970s, theorists saw nationalism as the religion of modernization. It was a puritan ideology of self-sacrifice.

In this Durkheimian model, nationalism becomes a form of reflexive collective self-worship. Just as Islam is sometimes political. This was a civil religion.

For Lucian Pye and other theorist, this civic religion is a stage on the way to real modernity, without religion. David Apter said it uses 'mobilisation systems,' and invents a symbolic mythology to persuade the masses to make necessary sacrifices.

Marginal youth

Elie Kedourie's first book, Nationalism (1960), argued that nations sprang from Kant's doctrine of the good will coming from the autonomous will. Fichte married this to Herder's cultural populism to argue for linguistic communities that realize their freedom collectively.

Unfortunately, Kedourie noted, these young revolutionary messianic movements ended in ethnic hatred.

In his second book, Nationalism in Asia and Africa (1971), noted that economic export was not the goal of colonies. It was a place for Europeans to hire administrators and work out their inter-national competitions.

100 - Unforeseen consequences, traditional societies were uprooted in the name of bureaucratic administration. Traditional handicrafts suffered. Mass education undermined traditional beliefs.

This created marginal men who did not belong in their societies, via western education, and they globbed on to nationalism.

Nationalism was utterly alien to political traditions of Asia and Africa with their empires and tribal kingdoms, respectively.

But from Theodosius in 379 AD, the Crusades, wars of religion and Rousseau's Civil Religion, the West has striven for homogeneity.

The cult of 'dark gods'

102 - This import of nationalism drew on a past. But, Confucius, Buddha, Muhammad and Isaiah were prophets and teachers, not invested in proving national greatness.

But the need to enlist these pasts shows that nationalism was a program of spiritual mobilization.

Colonial administrators were frustrated by their ultimate lack of access to European institutions.

A millennial opiate

That nations have not only a usable heroic past, but a shared glorious future, is a very old idea in the West. In 1254, Joachim of Fiore spoke of the coming great millennium of 1,000 years. In this time private and public will be united under the banner of love and brotherhood. So fraternity is not a new European goal.

This millennial view could require destruction as in Bakunin and Robespierre. So the revolutionary violent cult of nationalism based in Kali, came from us. The nationalist leader feels with the people and sometimes must use terror to bring the people back to themselves – to bring about the age of universal love.

Colonialism and the intellectuals

Kedourie makes three new claims:

- 1) The disconnect between European ideals and practices creates alienated men.
- 2) This gets filled by millennial doctrines of progress.
- 3) The violence comes from the resulting tranvaluation of values.

He does not do this for all times and places, ala Gellner, he does it in Central Europe first and then 20th century Asia and Africa. In all cases traditional values suffer.

Another strain is Kedourie's hatred of nationalism. It is terrible because it believes in unattainable progress and golden times, which breeds frustration and violence. And, it involves the sin of pride.

Smith questions the diffusion model of imposed Western nationalism on the grounds that it had to be accepted and embraced to work. Can we chalk the acceptance up to the adoption by a few indigenous intellectuals?

Furthermore, colonialism varied. The French used an elite to impose their rule. The British did more "indirect rule," wherein locals took ownership. Also, variations of missionaries and their education systems should be taken into the account.

108 - Local cultural groups used nationalism to further their traditional aims. Thus we cannot understand the specific nature of Indian, Kenyan, or Nigerian nationalisms without understanding these pre-existing social and cultural groups.

Kedourie's claim that nationalism fills the void left by the West's destruction of traditional communities assumes that people need stable communities (rather than enjoy change) and that nationalism is a totally new social grouping without any indigenous precedent. Even if so, why not belong to class, city, religion or continent, or the State, why "nationalism"?

109 - Kedourie's vision paints the indigenous as innocents forced out of Eden to eat the idea of progress, never to return to the warmth of tradition and family again. BOOM!

Millennialism and progress

Kedourie traces this narrative back to medieval heresies. Smith doesn't buy the connection to German nationalists.

And sometimes nationalism doesn't seek millennial revolution, only autonomy from alien rulers. And, not all wish to collapse, as in the millennial vision, the distinction between the private and public. He chooses extreme examples, but most nationalists are ordinary bourgeois, lower-middle class folk trying to escape oppression.

And Kedourie might say the elites of the movement are fanatical. This again raises the question of the gulf between them and the passive following masses.

And, as Smith has written, millennialism appeals to the poorest and most uneducated. The elite leaders are usually well educated.

The religion of history

113 - Nationalism seeks to refashion the future in the image of the past, the genuine past of a people in their homeland. Religion and history must be taken seriously and be made political via emotions to work.

Thus for him, the history and religion are tools with no previous legitimacy. Islam and Orthodoxy become hard to explain in this view. But, then how do the elite persuade the masses? The attempts to remake the masses via education have only worked temporarily.

So he takes secular millennialism very seriously, but sees religion as a trick foisted on the masses by elites, in a distorted way.

Juergensmeyer says nationalism is not rebelled against, it is the secularized version. The religious version of nationalism, brings it back to purity.

Kapferer analyzes an Australian War Memorial for Galipoli and sees religious art style used to celebrate a secular crusade. Thus we have a 'religion of history.'

The present, does not have the ability to completely remake the past in its image.

116 - Kedourie sees nationalism as an evil leading to violence. But nationalism has engulfed many people for whom the nation and its rhetoric are just 'icing on the cake.' The cultural cake does not get removed for this icing.

Chapter 6 - Invention and Imagination

1983 saw Hobsbawm's *The Invention of Tradition* and Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* published. Both stemmed from a Marxist tradition, but supplemented it with 'postmodern' deconstructionism. Thus they sought to deconstruct.

Inventing Nations

Nations as 'invented traditions'

In the intro to *The Invention of Traditions*, Hobsbawm argued that we can best understand nations by understanding national traditions.

118 - These traditions inculcate certain values which automatically imply a link with the past. The Gothic style of the post WW II rebuilt parliament is an example.

Invented traditions are not custom or convention or routine. They are flexible whereas traditions are not. Custom is what judges do. Tradition is the robe, wig and ritual.

In changing time, societies create traditions using old symbolism in new ways. Flags, anthems and historic continuities had to be created with nations.

Even old traditions, like English Christmas carols are put in new settings and functions.

There are 3 types of invented traditions, those that:

- 1) Establish or symbolize social cohesion.
- 2) Legitimize institutions, or status relations with authority.
- 3) Inculcate value systems or conventions of behavior.

The old practices were specific and strongly binding. The new ones are vague in the content of values and obligations: they deal in 'patriotism,' 'loyalty,' and such. And, they are compulsory.

Hobsbawm focuses on emotionally and symbolically charged signs, such as flags and anthems. We have, in modern nations and times, very few remaining traditions. Those that remain are prominent.

Even Israeli and Palestinian nations are new as territorial states were only created recently and were only taken seriously after WW I.

These traditions are, he tells us in the chapter he wrote, invented by elites who thought change and immigration required them.

Two stages of nationalism

121 - Nationalism is only interesting to Hobsbawm to the extent that it manifests in a state. Nations are made by nationalists: It is pure social engineering.

There are two types of nationalism.

- 1) Those that are mass movement based, ala the French Revolution. It created, under the threshold principle, areas large enough to support a capitalist market economy. These flourished from 1830 -1870.
- 2) The second sort is that of 'ethno-linguistic' nationalism. This is an Eastern Europe 1870 - 1914 model and resurfaced in the 1970s and 1980s.

One sort is top down, the other the reverse. But, mostly they are top down. But they must be analyzed from below with attention to fears, hopes, longings, of ordinary folk.

122 - The crucial period was 1870 to 1914, when the mass movement civic-democratic type got transformed into the elite ethnic linguistic type.

In this period we see a shift wherein any group can be a nation, the threshold idea is abandoned. Thus unhistorical nations emerged on any criteria. And there was a sharp move to the right. The conflation of race, language and nationality happened in this late 19th century period. During this period, foreigners became a boogey boo, especially Jews.

The demise of nationalism

The late 20th has seen a revision of this ethno-linguistic type. It is done in the name of modernity, but leans heavily backwards. It is a protest against the other.

Globalisation and the international division of labor has removed these functions. And communications and international travel have ended the idea of an ethnically homogeneous nation state. Nationalism is now irrelevant.

Nationalism is a substitute for lost dreams.

Ethnic and civic nationalisms?

125 - Hobsbawm's vision makes nations really a product of late capitalism, a period of industrialization, urbanization, and democratization. And, only in Europe.

He backs this assertion by showing their recent geniture. While both hate nationalism, Kedourie saw manipulation via alienated intellectuals, Hobsbawm, more capitalists. Both diminish the import of the French Revolution. But, Smith argues, France was clearly a nationalist, not just a Bourgeois, revolution.

This example, not just reactions to Napoleon unleashed nationalisms. Nationalism arose aplenty during this time, though few resulted in states. For Hobsbawm these don't count as they don't fulfill the market goal. Thus, like Beuilly, he employs an overly strict definition.

Nor, Smith argues, does this rife distinction between "ethnic-linguistic" and "civic-political" kinds of nationalism hold. If you look closely, the most civic and political nationalisms had ethnic and linguistic bases. This was certainly the case with the French Revolution. The use of this division reveals no pattern.

And, he cannot see any cultural heritage as it messes up his argument.

'Proto-national' bonds

What Hobsbawm presents us is the old Hegelian idea of a 'historyless peoples.' These people are inert and pawns of elite manipulation. His 'proto-national' bonds are inert and need elites to make them nationalist.

128 - Why couldn't these proto-nationalisms have been the basis of states? Hobsbawm's assertion that there could be no connection between medieval German ethno-linguistic and political ties in the Holy Roman Empire and modern Nationalism or the Jews in their past flies in the face of much evidence. The Welsh and Swiss were tied to their land, without any history of a State (the Welsh only fleetingly).

Again, this view gives no role to the masses. And, it assumes that the elites have no traditions, but only find them and promote them artificially.

The nation as a construct?

129 - What does it mean to say the nation is a social construct? Why do the elites choose this particular construct? Why does this discourse (of nationalism) resonate with the masses?

With his capitalist 'threshold' model he cannot explain smaller states. To condemn the latter as historically irrelevant, does not further the explanation.

Only Prys Morgan, in Hobsbawm's edited collection, gives an answer. In discussing the revival of Welsh culture, when he connects the it to poetry contests in 18th century taverns. This is how 18th century Welsh cultural nationalists in London learned of them.

The traditions are not invented ex nihilo, they must jive with the historical imagination. Certainly they are reworked. But they are not invented.

The problem of emerging States in Africa and Asia, for example, points to the failure when the artifice is not real enough to resonate with the people. When an attempt at homogenizing is made, it is done – as in Burma – on the basis of the majority ethnicity's past. Yes, the name Pakistan, was invented by a Cambridge student. But the concentration of Muslims made this possible.

Smith does not argue that no invention took place. Rather, the invention is partial and must jive with a pre-existing reality of some sort to speak to the masses.

If anything, the political part is invention, but not the cultural.

Imagining the Nation

Two fatalities

131 - Anderson, a Marxist, deals with the inadequacy of Marxist theorizing about 'the national question.' As the end of the nation, long prophesized, is not remotely near, this continuing anomaly needs explanation.

He defines nationalism as an imagined political community based on death and babel.

In a secular age, we need posterity and the nation keep us from the threat of oblivion. Like religion, nationalism takes death and suffering seriously, in a way that progressive and evolutionary Marxism and liberalism do not.

Babel is the other key. Capitalism requires a uniform language.

Historical preconditions

The three elements that had to die to make modern nationalism necessary were 1) Sacred script communities; 2) sacred monarchical high centers; 3) cosmological time.

The great religious communities of Islam, Christianity and Middle China saw themselves as overarching and 'cosmically central, through the medium of sacred language, linked to a superterrestrial order of power.'

Their writings were seen as sacred languages, not arbitrary signs.

134 - Books create imagined communities of readers. Newspapers do this when we read our papers simultaneously every day.

Print-communities

What, in a positive sense, made the new communities imaginable was a half-fortuitous, but explosive, interaction between a system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of communications (print), and the fatality of human linguistic diversity.

He claims that Latin America and North America were the earliest cases of nationalism!

An imagined community?

Anderson's is a postmodern reading.

It is not that the community is imagined that is problematic. Anderson notes that communities larger than small villages must be. It is their link with representation in plays, novels, scores, and newspapers, that is new.

A problem is, says Smith, the word "imagined." It is easy to slip from this to "created" or "imaginary" or "illusory," or "fabricated." It claims that the nation is no more than the sum of its fabricated cultural representations. This ignores the traditions that undergird so many nations.

Secondly, his emphasis on the individual imagination deflects attention away from the collective attachment and sentiment. Imagination can spread the idea of nation, but why does it? Why has it so universally?

Lastly, the thrust of Anderson's definition is individualistic and volunteeristic. Language is the main criterion. Ethnicity, religion, colour don't count. So any group with a shared language is a nation.

138 - There is a lot to be gained by seeing how communities are represented in literature. But, to describe a nation solely in these terms is to miss other elements. Symbols, myths, values, memories, attachments, customs, and traditions, laws, institutions, routines, and habits, get left out.

Print-capitalism and re-presentation

Print is over emphasized. In many African and Asian national formations, few were literate. Even in Europe this was true. Symbols, songs, images, reports and rituals also got people to fight in wars. It was the nationalists who, once in power, created mass education.

Landscapes, monuments, buildings, tomb styles, were also part of the historic environment. Radio, television, film and religion are also largely overlooked.

In the 2nd edition, Anderson points out the importance of colonial state, and its census takers, and cartographers, and ethnographers, in defining the nations of Southeast Asia. Yet he reverts to his central thesis of print language.

Mass self-sacrifice

The reliance on the end of sacred monarchies, sacred script and homogeneous time, presents another problem for Anderson. All elements must, he claims, be there.

In terms of self-sacrifice, how do we get from knowing about the nation to loving it and feeling it? Anderson says it is in the way it is likened to a family. And that the family gets love because it gives disinterested love. But families and nations have interests. It is because we know our interests are bound with it, Smith corrects, that we identify with them. We bond with the dead via the nation.

Thus the concept of nation is not merely intellectual, it is felt passionately as a real community.

141 – and it is not the case that all sacred script communities declined and thereby made the space for the nation. Islam. Judaism. Orthodox religion in Greece is the lynchpin of national identity.

Juergensmeyer points out that religion and nationalism are often co-joined.

And the linear time, marked by clock and calendar, were well known in antiquity. Is there a connection? How would you establish it?

Liah Greenfeld and Michael Walzer and others have tied the nation to Protestantism and the spread of vernacular language. But this is not modernist in that it happened well before capitalism and the decline of religion.

142 – Anderson's main impact has been, not the details, but the idea of imagination and representation as the creators of nation. This is interesting.

It has taken us to psychology and culture. But, it has bypassed the need to give an overall structural explanation of historical groups.

Imagined community and invented tradition have signaled the dissolution of classical modernism and its replacement by the many smaller 'postmodern' analyses of the nation. We'll look at that in the end.

Now we turn to the attempts to replace modernism with more viable paradigms and analyses.

PART II – CRITICS and ALTERNATIVES

Chapter 7 – Primordialism and perennialism

The creation of modernist grand narrative of recent national creation is giving way to limited models that look at particular aspects of the study of nationalism and nations. But the modernist paradigm still rules. And those who challenge do not put

forward alternative grand narratives. So we have untenable paradigms or limited accounts of specific problems.

145 - In this chapter we will see why primordial and perennial alternatives are inadequate.

Primordialism I: Inclusive fitness

The oldest paradigm is the nationalist one. This is the one against which modernists have fought.

In 1944 Hans Kohn divided theories into the voluntarist ones and the organic ones where national identity is stamped upon the individual. Kohn thought the first type was Anglo-Saxon. The second East of the Rhine.

The organic model is, of course, the target of modernists. They might ask if nations have no existence apart from the ideas and goals of nationalism. Perhaps they wake a population that never entertained the idea of a nation.

A problem comes for the primordialists when they introduce the idea of biology and the 'primordial' tie of nationality.

147 - The lead sociobiologist is Pierre van den Berghe. He sees the nation as an extension of kin selection. The larger a society the more reciprocity and coercion add to a society; but kin is always a factor (albeit diminished). The common ancestor made tribes able to grow to tens of thousands and keep the kin myth going.

Ethnocentrism developed along kin. That is why ethnocentrism is the norm. Genetic relatedness increases cooperation and so inclusive fitness.

But how do we recognize kin? Any cultural marker will do: language, religion, customs, dress, hairstyles, manners, myths of common ancestry, what have you.

The problem is that myths of common ancestry is not common ancestry. He says if folks look alike and intermarry, the myth is believed and that is enough.

But we have many multiple ancestry myth based societies. The French are the Franks and the Gauls. The Anglo-Saxon.

Someone says it breaks down because it explains non-genetic transmission on a genetic - based model. And how can it be expanded to millions who we don't know? Smith says it can only be explained if we go into social psychology and that is not genetic. So we go to the cultural version of primordialism.

Primordialism II: cultural givens

Edward Shils distinguished between public civil ties and primordial ties of family, religious and ethnic groups. He said primordial ties of kinship and religion were still alive in modern societies.

This was taken up by Clifford Geertz. He studied new nations and their populations were bound together less by the civil ties of a rational society than by the primordial ties which arose on the cultural basis of language custom, race, religion and other.

We need, Geertz claimed, to have our worth publically validated (this is kin based) and the other to build an efficient, dynamic, modern state.

The opposition of these two haunts African and Asia with their nepotism.

153 - We have ties in groups based on Assumed blood ties, race, language, region, religion, and custom.

The instrumentalist critique

Paul Brass (1979) fought this by noting some primordial attachments are variable. Many are bilingual, religions are subject to change by reformers. Place of birth may lose its emotional significance due to migration.

Primordial groups do not predict nations, is another dig. Also, ethnic ties are non-rational and often threaten civil society.

Brass distinguishes between groups with a long history to unite them, Islam and Jews, and newer ethnic groups. But, he says it is impossible to square the primordialists, with the instrumentalists (who say groups are functional) simply by saying some ties are stronger than others.

Still he distances himself from extreme instrumentalists who say that culture is infinitely malleable and people chose whichever serves their political interests or mobilizes the masses best.

Eller and Coughlan, say primordial attachments are outside the realm of socially constructed emotions and so are intelligible and unsociological.

They use empirical studies to show ethnic ties are continually being renewed and reinterpreted.

They especially disagree with the idea that such primordial ties are just there and not construed socially.

156 - Steven Grosby says only certain objects are in the category of primordial. Humans participate in historically evolving patterns of belief. We have always been attached to primordial groups because they protect life.

The instrumentalist critique is misguided and its sociology shallow.

Both instrumentalists and primordialists, says Smith, are reductionist. They pit interest against affect. Daniel bell saw a combination of interest and affect in ethnic ties.

Geertz in fact said the 'untraceable but yet sociologically real kinship' of ethnicity was one of several of sources of beliefs, actions, attachments, and sentiments. And Geertz talks of states playing with primordial attachments (he didn't use the word).

And he isn't saying the attachments are objective, but rather felt because folks believe in them.

A theory of ethnicity and nationalism, Smith says, that fails to address the power of resulting ties and propensity for self-sacrifice, is deficient.

Sometimes it seems that instrumentalist and social construct folks made their theories in affluent, stable, western societies and cannot explain hot nationalisms. In Bosnia, India, and the Middle East a "blood-and-homeland" primordialism seems more apposite.

But, the primordial explanation is just a tautology. It redescribes what it observes. It does not explain the formation, course, and decline of instances of these phenomena.

Also it does away with the need for historical sociology, it cannot explain different forms of attachment. This is a powerful, however, point of departure for more convincing explanations.

Perennialism I: ethnic continuity

159 - The primordial / instrumentalist debate is largely concerned with ethnicity and not nationalism. But they have greatly influenced the discussion of nationalism.

In the past one could be sure that modernists were also instrumentalists and vice-versa. Not now. Also, not all perennialists turn out to be primordialists. Here, we'll look at some combinations.

Perennialists refers to a belief in the historical antiquity of the type of social and political organization known as the 'nation.' Perennialists view nations as updated versions of old ethnic communities or collective cultural identity. It's the same phenomena.

On the other hand, perennialists refuse to see either nations or ethnic groups as 'givens' in nature; they are strictly historical and social, rather than natural, phenomena.

Society is a human construct and a constant.

For example, Joshua Fishman's analysis of ethnicity and language in Eastern Europe. Jews and Greeks have an immemorial ubiquity and subjectivity of unmobilized ethnicity.

It has a biological component, but it also involves 'doing.' That is songs, chants, rituals, etc. It isn't a being thing, but a doing thing. Ethnic doings can reinterpret. These groups can undergo change, but must be true to their core ways.

Smith asks, who feels these doings? Elites? Who authenticates the doings and knowings? Is there only one standard of authenticity? What of groups that move and take new identities or intermarriage? Can you have dual-ethnic belongings? What of groups with less well documented pasts? It may not work well in mobile western societies.

And, he doesn't bridge the gap from ethnicity to nation for us. What of conquest, colonization, etc?

Perennialism II: perennial ethnicity, modern nations

Walker Connor also does ethnic perennialism. He says a nation is a group that shares a non-rational bond. Nationalists leaders know this even if scholars are confused. Check Mao, Mussolini and Hitler.

But this will not, as with primordialists, have any basis in reality.

This irrationality means that rational choice models and class conflict theories miss the point. People do not voluntarily die for things that are rational.

Nationalism is more tied to ethnicity and patriotism tied to the State. While an ethnic group may be other-defined, a nation must be self-defined.

163 - He is, though, exceedingly modern in that he thinks nations exist when most of the population becomes aware of themselves as one. So, he treats with extreme caution the idea of nations prior to the late 19th century.

After all, nationalism is a mass, not an elite thing. We cannot know what percentage of a nation feels itself part of a nation. What of immigrants to America? Most peasants in France didn't become Frenchmen until WW I. Enfranchisement is a good measure. By that measure, didn't become nations until the early 20th century.

The idea that alien rule is illegitimate existed. And it grew. Nationalism has spread only in the 20th with mass communication and state sponsored education spreading the idea that nationalism is tied to ethnicity. And, the publicity of successful ethnic - national revolutions inspired folks.

Smith says his exclusively social psychology analysis omits rich cultural elements of memory and symbolism. It better shows how masses are mobilized than originate. And, we have no census of sentiment for pre-modern times. Are we really to accept that nations only exist when folks can vote? Are then only democracies nations?

Saying only mass nations are nations is a tautology. Could we not have more middle class or elite nations? Can we not be aware of our nation even if we do not make the decisions? That is what Smith says happened in the early modern period.

The psychology of ethnic affiliation

A similar combination of perennial ethnicity with political modernism is in Donald Horowitz's, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*.

165 - Ethnic ties are pyramided on family ties, and meet the widespread need for familiarity and community. It carries familial emotion, even if we're only talking about cultural traits in common.

Groups are universal. He cites Henri Tajfel's experiments in group formation on minimal info and the subsequent willingness to sacrifice economic gain for positive social identity in a group. But ethnicity is ascriptive and so hard to change. The groups compare each other and want high self-esteem.

This results in stereotypes.

Now states, such as the West and Africa, are multi-ethnic so comparisons are more intense. And so groups compete for the prize of power over the state.

He focuses on colonialism. His sociological orientation, says Smith, means he underestimates religion and cultural traditions as resources for nationalism. At the same time he does great multi-ethnic state analysis. But he doesn't show why some rise and some fall and some form nations while others don't.

The immemorial nation?

If, as Connor and Horowitz claim, national communities grew out of ethnic communities, are nations not perennial?

John Armstrong says the nation is simply a modern equivalent of pre-modern ethnic identity. They form and dissolve throughout history, but are a constant feature.

167 - In pre-modern times these groupings did not legitimize polity formation - it wasn't a goal. But he also speaks of nations emerging slowly in the pre-modern world.

After 1800 though they explicitly use the language of nationalism.

But he sees these ethnic identities as relying on social boundaries rather than primordial attachments or kinship ties. So does he see nations as growing out of older kinship ties? Or do the changing social ties in the pre-modern time have nothing to do with kinship?

Smith sees both in his writing, but believes he adheres to a recurrent rather than a continuous version of perennialism.

In contrast to Armstrong, many historians have been concerned to trace a continuity between particular modern nations and pre-modern ethnic communities. There is more a 'continuous perennialism.' Pre-modern historians, for example, saw germs of nations everywhere in the middle ages.

For Steven Grosby and others, we can use the term 'nation' with ancient Israel in the 7th century bc. Moab, Edom and Egypt too were nations. Greece and Mesopotamia were city states or empires because they didn't believe in a single land inhabited by a single people. Whereas now we have legal citizenship as a bond, they had a religious bond.

169 - Grosby has cultural primordialism. But, is his use of 'nation' similar to other scholars? Aren't citizenship, mass education, mass culture and voting part of the modern definition? Grosby would say they're too narrow.

Might there be two kinds? Modern and pre-modern? But, we don't want to do retroactive nationalism. If we say now is so different that the definition doesn't travel back in time, what is the variable that makes the difference?

Chapter 8 – Ethno-symbolism

Three opposed antinomies:

- 1) The "essence" of a nation as opposed to its constructed qualities.
- 2) The antiquity of the nation versus its purely modern appearance.
- 3) The cultural basis of nationalism contrasted with its political aspirations and goals.

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Historians have debated #2 and #3 especially.

- Objectivists stress the role of culture and more especially language.
- The subjectivists for whom nations are formed by popular will and political action. For objectivists, nations and national sentiment could be found as far back as the 10th century. Whereas for subjectivists, both are the product of the 18th century.

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Old, 'continuous' nations

While historians would accept nationalism, as new, nations are less sure.

171 - Liah Greenfeld's massive study finds national sentiment in England in the early 16th century. For her 'nationalism' signifies 'National sentiment' rather than 'nationalist ideology.' By the early 17th, with the rise of Protestantism, it had turned to outright nationalist ideology, albeit in religious language. But her early 16th century definition does include the majority of people identifying with the nation.

The reformation of Henry is an important nationalist moment in England. But historians such as Adrian Hastings do not know why it isn't earlier like the 14th century, when English became prevalent in administration and law, or even late Anglo-Saxon England when an early nation-state with a common religion, vernacular language, administration and compact territory came into being. Thus it is taken back to the 11th century. The names England and Britain were in use.

This goes back to the Vulgate Bible, in which the idea of the Israeli nation inspired English nationalism. By the late 16th weekly church service brought and English Protestantism to near everyone. Fighting against Catholics for their identity.

By the early 18th century, we have Scotland and so Britishness emerges; especially against France.

173 - Hugh Seton-Watson came up with "old, continuous" nations versus deliberately created ones. What Charles Tilly called nations by design. Old continuous are those prior to 1789. Oldones are the English, Scots, French, Dutch, Castilians and Portugese in the west and the Danes and Sweden in the North and the Hungarians, Poles and Russians in the East.

Others were formed by well known leaders with the written word and modern communications.

Pre-Modern nations?

Seton-Watson concedes some anachronisms. And that the definition of nationalism is vague. He says, "A nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one."

174 - But Susan Reynolds says this reading backwards tempts us to think of nations as inevitable.

To avoid confusion, she suggests the word "regnal" in place of "national. By about 900 the idea of peoples as communities of custom, descent, and government was well entrenched. These were, in turn, traced back to the 7th century.

There was in the medieval West a “regnal” consciousness, that married kinship, custom and a royal government. Like Connor and Grosby, Reynolds focuses on popular beliefs and ideas.

Lesley Johnson, says the evidence isn’t continuous enough (people who fight against this well know the political implications of their work). But the continuity is very clear in people shaped and carried by scriptural religion. The Armenians and Jews are outstanding examples, but not the only ones by any means.

176 - John Hutchinson needs more evidence. But, it is difficult if it is stipulated that both ethnicity and nationhood must be proven to be a mass phenomena.

Adrian Hastings says, we need to only show some beyond government circles, not all. And against, Connor, Gellner, and Hobsbawm cites Frances as a nation centered on Paris long before most peasants could speak French or thought of themselves as such.

Let’s now look at the antinomy between the political basis and the cultural one.

Cultural and political nationalism

177 - For Reynolds, regnum was political and cultural in content. The Middle Ages were full of these “peoples” with their rulers.

According to Mendels, culture and politics were not separate as parts of the Regnal in the Middle Ages.

But in modern times we make the split. Hobsbawm only looks at politics. Breuille sees nationalism as a political movement meant to fill the spiritual void. But their thinking dismisses culture, identity, and homeland.

John Hutchinson makes this point as he examines cultural nationalism. Political nationalism is important, he admits. But cultural forms of nationalism count too. Even though their often smaller and transient. He looks for “a cultural nationalism that seeks a moral regeneration of the community.” Often they switch. As culture falls political self-definition rises, and vice versa.

The cultural sees the state as accidental. The distinctive civilization, with a unique history, culture, and geographic profile mean more.

These folks are culturists that recognize the culture, even if the State falls.

This sort of nationalism especially took root in Eastern Europe in the late 19th century. The culturist leaders are “moral innovators who seek by ‘reviving’ an ethnic historicist vision of the natio to redirect traditionaliss and modernists.”

He looks at the Royal Irish Academy in 1785. The Gaelic League in the 1890s. These leaders were unable to move in English administration so took to this project for esteem.

Myth-symbol complexes

John Armstrong's Nations before Nationalism, the key is persistence, not genesis of ethnic notions. He finds Kings prior to Nationalism very concerned with ethnic homogeneity. The talk of the outsider is frequent.

Barth finds evidence of same in his socially bounded definition wherein he sees identity in the discussions of the other.

182 – Ethnicity is not purely inner, but a part of a quilt of groups, defined against each other.

The symbols of “us” usually persist that tell of their common fate.

A framework of national emergence

Armstrong sees not material differences, but different mental attitudes. Different nostalgia's for a “golden age” are important. 2 kinds: Islam's golden age of nomadic ways. And, Christian tranquil plots of earth. And the Muslims and Christians defined themselves as against each other.

Language and myth, memory and values are key for him.

Culture and the border

Armstrong's work is so varied so cannot be summarized in Smith's work. But, he has not given us an alternative grand narrative.

A problem is that his shifting boundaries doesn't jive with his theme of persistence.

Barth says transactions strengthen, not weaken, identities. His identities emerge in relations of peoples and intergenerationally.

Symbols have values, and myths explain them.

187 - Culture, says Smith, “is both an inter-generational repository and heritage, or set of traditions, and an active shaping repertoire of meanings and images, embodied in values, myths and symbols that serve to unite a group of people.” This internal view tells us more than the border does alone.

'Dual legitimation'

Smith now introduces his work.

Rather than Armstrong, he started with the nation and worked backwards. He is a student of Gellner's. He changed his mind at some point so he may not believe the following anymore.

1st, he defined nationalism as:

- 1) Doctrines of ideology
- 2) Movements
- 3) Sentiments, and
- 4) Processes of 'nation - building', to which he would later add
- 5) Symbols and languages (of nationalism)

The ideology of nationalism itself could be reduced to its essential propositions and its main tenets summarized:

- 1) The world is naturally divided into nations, each has its peculiar character and destiny;
- 2) The nation is the source of all political power, and loyalty to it overrides all other loyalties
- 3) If they wish to be free, and to realize themselves, men must identify and belong to a nation;
- 4) Global freedom and peace are functions of the liberation and security of nations
- 5) Nations can only be liberated and fulfilled in their own sovereign states.

His definition of nationalism in 1983:

"An ideological movement for attainment and maintenance of self-government and independence on behalf of a group, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential nation."

And he decided that even within organic and volunteeristic variations, there had to be: the ideals of national autonomy, national unity, and national identity.

With all this, he agreed with modernism.

But he looked more at religious organizations. Next to the scientific state, this led to 'dual legitimizations.' The State challenges religion's place. The rejected intellectuals become instigators of ethnic revivals.

189 - This was the picture in his 1981 book, *The Ethnic Revival*. But by the early 1990s, Smith saw holes in it. The alienated intelligentsia theory didn't explain popular acceptance. And it used the same term, nationalism, for the elite version and popular version.

Ethnies and ethno-symbolism

Nationalism could be dated back to the late 18th century (even given earlier religious nationalisms in England and Holland). But, national structures, sentiments, and symbolism went back further, at least to the late medieval period for England,

France, Poland, and Russia. And, it seemed that Jews, Armenians, Japanese and Koreans had had actual nations of some sort.

These cast doubt on Gellner's claim that nations were impossible in the pre-modern period. Worse yet, on several continents, there were not just objective cultural differences, but subjective ethnic identities and ethnic communities. WHO KNEW???

One could point to both ethnic continuity and ethnic recurrence. Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Persians, Chinese and Japanese, for example. Name, language, customs, religious community and territorial associations were maintained for millennia with continuity.

Peoples of Ethiopia, the Fertile Crescent, northern India and the Balkans had recurrent nationalisms. So Smith started switching from nationalism studies to ethnies (the French term for 'ethnic communities') and began looking at myths, memories, values, traditions, and symbols.

By 1986 he wrote "The Ethnic Origins of Nations" which defined ethnic communities as named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories, and culture, having an association with a specific territory, and a sense of solidarity.

191 - In the medieval worlds, ethnicity played a much larger role than modernists, who rightly reject conflating this with modern nationalism, were willing to concede. And, this rich and well documented 'ethno-history' was a major cultural resource for nationalists. (somehow academics had overlooked this data!)

His was not primordialism. Culture, not kinship, was the root.

193 - These cultural affinities were often strengthened, thus changed, by outside invaders (see Greeks at Salamis). And, economic, administrative changes in the late 17th, early 18th century brought ethnicity to the door of polity formation. But the roots of the cultures go back even further than Gutenberg. The Scot identity was strengthened in wars with the English in the 14th and 15th century.

Origins and types of nation

How are nations formed? It depends on which of the two types of Ethnies they're based on:

One is lateral and extensive (Elite), and here these people must draw increasing numbers of middling and even lower folk into the culture to create a nation. This leads to a more civic type of identity.

Two is vernacular, here the intelligentsia rediscover and deploy cultural identity to make a nation.

Third is that of immigrant nations like America, Canada, and Australia, we have a "frontier nationalism," And this accepts plurality.

None of these is guaranteed to become successful modern states. This depends on market capitalism, the bureaucratic state and secular, mass education, either directly, or via colonial education.

And political archaeologists have provided memories of heroes, arts and sacred geography.

But in many cases this is only half the story. There are widely known historical precedents that the nation is built upon.

195 - And, global culture and the EU have failed to generate love; timeless, placeless, technical, and affectively neutral, they provide no identity. The nation has no rival for affections and loyalty of most human beings (1990).

Ethno-symbolism reconsidered

One criticism of his work has been that it might read nationalism backwards. But, he and Armstrong and Hutchinson distinguish between the newer and older forms of nationalism.

John Breuilly has criticized it for ignoring institutions as historical carriers of national or ethnic identities. Only dynasties or churches would have myth symbols codified and reproduced: Neither were nationalist. He says the discontinuities are more striking than the continuities between pre-modern and modern. All institutions: parliaments, popular literature, courts, schools, labour markets, et are modern.

197 - Institutions, Smith replies, are important. Armstrong's work demonstrates their importance in the pre-modern epoch. And, many were not included that were not included then.

But Breuilly's understanding of these institutions is too narrowly modernist. Many were included in the institutions of transmission. Look at Egypt and Sumer. Look at monasteries. Their inclusion, more importantly, was in language and popular literature, in rituals and celebrations, in trade fairs and markets, in ethnic homelands, not to mention army service.

And, some of these ethnicities did have political significance. See the Hellenes.

The division between then and now sometimes comes from the overly modern definition of a nation.

Chapter 9 – Beyond Modernism?

In Polyethnicity and National Unity in World History, William H. McNeill argued that nationalism and nations only belonged to a particular period of the world, that of Western modernity. Nations were unknown in the pre-modern era. Before and after nations, we'll go back to the norm of "polyethnic hierarchy."

Polyethnicity, past and future

For McNeill, only barbarism is monoethnic. The moment civilization happens, polyethnicity becomes the norm. Civilization is largely metropolitan. Trade and conquest fuel this. Only those far from centers of civilizations, like England, Japan and Sweden retain their homogeneity.

It was only after about 1700 that the ideal of independence for ethnically homogeneous populations emerged as an ideal.

Among causes: Reading publics, population rise allowing ethnically homogenous folks to crowd the cities (and fuel revolutionary discontent), and – most importantly – modern infantry drills. The last being important as wars made national identity important for survival.

All this came apart after 1945. Then the need for labor brought in Gastarbeiter from alien cultures and land who perpetuated themselves on western soil.

Smith says, this assumes that the nation state and polyethnic hierarchy are opposites (though he demonstrates they are coextensive, of not symbiotic). It also forgets the onion character of ethnicity, with concentric circles of loyalty.

This congruity is just as plausible as the breakdown of these multicultural states into many small nationalist states.

The post-national agenda

Recent themes are highlighted in McNeill's work:

- 1) The impact of population movement / multiculturalism
- 2) The impact of feminist analysis on the national project
- 3) Impact of globalization trends and the postmodern supranational projects on nationality

While ostensibly, these debates turn their back on modernism and all large-scale narratives and high-level theorizing.

202 - This postmodern turn does not undermine, but extends the modernist paradigm.

Fragmentation and hybrid identities

Homi Bhabha sees the narratives of the people split between past and present, the self and other, between pedagogical and performative narratives.

203 - Like Simmel, he highlights the impact of the other on identity. The great influx of foreigners has undermined identity. Now all collective identities have become plural and are housed in "anxious states."

Partha Chatterjee showed how discourse in Asia and Africa derived from western models; and were used to fight colonialism.

Indian nationalism out of Bengal uses western and indigenous materials. It appeals to fragments of the nation, women, minorities, outcasts. So it is not just the other that forms identities, Smith editorializes.

For Stuart Hall and others, ethnicity is a shifting, permeable and situational, concept. It derives its meaning from its articulation with other kinds of identity, notably class and gender.

Ethnicity is not natural, we are told by academics, it is created via language community and race.

Hall says ethnicity comes from hegemonic national identity. But he likes the new way that engages rather than suppresses difference.

Smith celebrates this, however underhandedly, as having illuminated that our national identities are frayed at the edges. (I would add that it has contributed to fraying us at the edges). Smith says we should not underestimate how much immigrants wish to be parts of our nations even with ethnicity (symbolic ethnicity).

National unity in the past should, also, not be overestimated.

But as we intermarry, etc, ethnicity does not become a 'pick and mix' option. We can eat Turkish and Chinese, but we cannot be that. For most folks, 'voluntary ethnicity' is not an option.

Gender and nation

From the 1980s there has been a growing literature on gender and nationalism; to see women in national projects. This especially looks at the gender stereotypes of women in constructing ethnicity.

The role of women in nationalism

206 - Women's movements were active in many non-Western nationalisms, Sylvia Walby notes in her survey of the field-to-date.

In new non-Western nations, women were given citizenship immediately. This was a way that aspirants could popularize their claims to nationality. Ziya Gokalp says that comes from indigenous Turkish mores.

Female symbolism of the nation

Nira Yuval-Davis shows women to be vital components of cultural reproduction used selectively by different social agents.

The Motherland and its purity. Men must sacrifice themselves for women and children, in the mold of Plutarch's Spartan women, whom Rousseau so admired. The women are figures of honor.

Nationalism as a male phenomenon

For Cynthia Enloe, nationalism comes from masculinized memory, humiliation, and hope. Women, Walby notes, often play more of a role in Green and anti-nuclear international commitments.

Against this, we see women taking military roles in national liberation struggles. This means at time class and gender get subsumed.

George Mosse shows how the choreography of mass nationalism was conditioned by the Western respectable moral character and Greek beauty. Germans saw the French as 'loose-living,' as opposed to masculine German morality.

The French Revolution too, Glanda Sluga tells us, relied on images of masculine citizenry. This is based on the division of the private and public selves. The woman nurtures the heroic masculine male.

Feminism and identity politics

For Yuval – Davis, identity problems harden ethnic and gender boundaries. Same with multiculturalism. This can harm women in terms of encouraging minority male control over women.

210 - Smith says this analysis is fruitful. How far we need to deconstruct in terms of 'narratives' and 'discourses' and describe them as 'hegemonic' 'constructs' is open to debate. Few of these theories touch on the formation of nations or their ubiquity.

Liberalism and civic or ethnic nationalism

Yuval-Davis' espousal of 'transversal politics' makes sense only in liberal democracies; in 'civic' democracies as opposed to 'ethnic' ones.

David Miller defends civic nationalism. He says there are 5 characteristics of a nation as a community:

- 1) shared belief and mutual commitment;
- 2) Extended history;
- 3) active in character;
- 4) connected to a particular territory
- 5) marked of from other communities by its distinct public culture.

211 - Nations are sources of identity, ethical and have a valid claim to self-determination, says Miller. Despite our commitment to internationalism, in practice we are ethical particularists. The nation is also the best vehicle for 'social justice.' And, it achieves liberal and social democratic goals better than radical multiculturalism (which cannot restrain the rich and strong and fragments us). Nationalism is better than "citizenship" as it connects us with history and gives us a sense of place and time.

Brenda O'Leary criticizes him in that his model favors the powers-that-be. And it marginalized ethnics. Ultimately, Miller favors civic nationalism.

Political science has been keen to find a way to manage multi-ethnicity. Partition, population transfer, genocide, assimilation, federation are different methods. But this is only tangentially related to issues of national identity and nationalism. So . . .

Canada has gone from ethnicity to civic nationalism. Though diversity is real, we can usefully distinguish between Ethnic, Civic, and Plural types of nationalism. They lead to immigration policies. Residence length and blood being bases for citizenship. Usually states, though, have ethnic and civic parts.

Habermas would replace nationalism with 'constitutional patriotism' that would focus collective loyalties. Viroli wants a form of republicanism. But, neither notices the strength of nationalism around the world. And republics were just as restrictive ethnically.

213 - It is good that people can discuss this ethnic nationalism now. For so long it was associated purely with fascism and so verboten. But as long as the most internationally popular type has a pariah status, it will remain explosive and underanalysed.

Nationalism and Globalisation

Will we go global? People argue that ethnicity and nations are being superseded. Most modernists don't go there. But postmodernists do! Stephen Castles is a globalist.

Now trade is international. But was there a time when nations were really solitary? And states now have more domestic power than ever. Will they give it up?

What of electronic culture? Is it American cultural imperialism? They also increase the intransigence of dispersed ethnic communities. And, states are being created, so increasing, despite the new global order.

National identity and supra-nationalism

Yacein Soysal notes that getting rights, if not citizenship, in Germany shows a post-national state.

What of a European cultural identity? This is a battle. Borders still matter for defense, trade, and immigration.

Beyond modernism?

The postmodern literature suggesting globalism rarely discusses history. This is wrong as nations are, if nothing else, historically embedded. They also generally offer not general explanation of nations or nationalism and how they came to being. Even as they deconstruct ethnicities and point to the multicultural nature of modernity, they elide the persistence of these groups as significant.

219 - The lack of theorizing may be from downright hostility to the nation on the part of most of the analysts. They like multicultural civic nationalism and hate the alignment of ethnicity and nations. But since it is the type that is so common and routinised, it required explanation. To reach multicultural civic nationalism they must avoid lots of evidence. That cannot make for good policy.

Just as ethnic identities and nationalisms are surging, they turn away from 'grand narratives.' So their arguments lack validity. And the 'little narratives' don't help. (anyway, those are narratives too; there is no place without story; its narratives all the way down).

The postmodernists are worse than classical modernists like Hobsbawm in that they totally elide historical analysis. He excludes, to some extent, gender studies from this generalization.

Conclusion

Problems, Paradigms, and prospects

Problems

Based on Weber:

- 1) How to treat the intersection of nationality and ethnicity
- 2) Definitions; ex. Is nation only when political?
- 3) Theoretical: Do we seek a causal or descriptive field?
- 4) Using different terms and frameworks, we have no field coordination
- 5) Different values promote different projects

Finally, what are the relevant questions for the field?

222 – They might include: Questions about the origins and formations of ethnies, conditions of ethnocentrism, the significance of ethnic identity; the origins and formation of nations, the nature and significance of national identity, the social, cultural, and political basis of nations ; the gender, class, cultural character of nationalist ideologies and movements, their role in forging nations and national identities, the place of intellectuals, the consequences for society and culture of a world of national states.

Paradigms

He still wants a general theory. It would help us understand the impact on ethnicities, nations, and international relations. But is it possible?

Not likely, but we know more now than when the early theories were introduced.

For example,:

- Primordialists have sensitized us to the intimate links between kinship, ethnicity and territory and the powerful sentiments of collective belonging.
- Perennialism views nations over the longue duree. It raises the continuous and reoccurring patterns. Ethnic ties not modernization make nations. They serve as a counter to extreme modernism.
- Ethno-symbolism shows how we reinterpret symbols, myths, memories, values, and traditions. The subjective historical is thereby highlighted.
- Modernists show how populations are mobilized. Anderson and Breuilly show us networks of communication. And, Breuilly and Giddens have done much to highlight the important role of the state.
- Postmodernists show fragmentation and suggest the post-national order. Feminism has been added by this group. They help us understand plural Western societies.

225 - These perspectives give a certain coherence to the field.

Prospects

On the one hand, no grand theory. On the other, learning more daily. Hopefully, the latter will one day contribute to the former.

Can the modernists and perennialists converge? We could do so on the level of theory. We'd have to agree on terms and allow exceptions to each other's rules.

Secondly, we could accommodate on the level of research. We could research and compare modern and pre-modern on these 6 axis:

- The State: Herein we could look at diffusion of loyalty and mobilization.
- Territory: Borders and how the idea of homeland contributes.

- Language: How does it contribute to nation formation, when, who speaks it?
- Religion: How was it propagated in various times and what role now and what role with ethnicity?
- History: We can compare historical consciousness in different times, looking especially at ethnic myths and golden ages.
- Rites and Ceremonies: How'd they do it?

We won't by this magically transcend divisions. But, scholars overlap more than they think.

As nationalism rises we need to know more. We cannot, therefore, evade the task of theory construction.